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Abstract: Historians still debate over the help extended by Francoist Spain to European
Jews during the Holocaust. The Spanish dictatorship always exaggerated the extent of
this assistance. This propagandist effort on the part of the Spanish regime to portray itself
as the savior of Jews in distress, especially Jews of Sephardic origin, was put to the test
during the 1950s and 1960s, when Madrid was asked to help Egyptian Jews following
the 1956 and 1967 wars in the Middle East.
Based on research in Spanish and Israeli archives, this article argues that: a) Spain
could have done more to help Egyptian Jews. Its policy was unclear and inconsistent.
Moreover, the assistance that was finally given was intended mainly to improve the dic-
tatorship’s image in the eyes of Western democratic public opinion; b) the Francoist dic-
tatorship did its best to prevent the settlement of Jews in Spain; c) the help extended to
Egyptian Jews owed more to the initiatives of individual Spanish diplomats than to the
policy adopted by the Spanish government; d) all this notwithstanding, the help given by
Spain to Egyptian Jews should be appreciated and considered within the context of its
overall effort to save Jews in distress in other Arab countries in the post-World War II
period.
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Sixty years after the end of World War II, scholars are still vigorously debating the
extent of the help given by Francoist Spain to save Jews during the Holocaust.1 How
many Jews were saved thanks to Spain’s assistance? Did the Franco regime adopt a clear
and consistent policy towards the Jewish plight? What were the motives behind the fre-
quent mutations and reversals in the decisions made by the government of the dictator-
ship when it had to deal with this issue? With the conclusion of the world conflict, Spain
found itself isolated in the international arena. General Francisco Franco, although for-
mally neutral during the war, was perceived as having collaborated with Nazi Germany
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2 On Spain’s international status in the post-war period, see, among others, Martínez Lillo (2000); Pardo
Sanz (2000); Balfour/Preston (1999); Espadas Burgos (1988).
and Fascist Italy, and denounced accordingly on all sides. In an effort to change its image
in Western public opinion, the Francoist regime embarked on a propaganda campaign,
emphasizing its unique character –“which had nothing to do with fascism”– and the dif-
ferences between itself and the defeated Axis powers.2
A special effort was made to exaggerate the magnitude of Spain’s contribution to
saving Jewish life during the Holocaust as a contrast to Nazi racism. A noteworthy exam-
ple of these efforts was the fifty page booklet published by the Spanish Foreign Ministry:
España y los judíos. The booklet was disseminated in many countries in Spanish, Eng-
lish, and French, and it claimed that Spain had done much more to rescue the Jews of
Europe than Western democracies (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 1949).
This propaganda campaign was put to the test during the 1950s and 1960s when
Madrid was asked to extend a helping hand to the Jews of Egypt and Morocco, who were
experiencing growing pressure and hardship in the context of the escalating Arab-Israeli
conflict and their identification with Zionism and the State of Israel. This article seeks to
analyze Spain’s reaction to this challenge, with special reference to the plight of Egypt-
ian Jews during the years 1956-1957, following the Suez crisis and Sinai campaign, as
well as during their exodus from Egypt after the Six-Day War.
Before I discuss each of these important episodes in detail, I would like to clarify my
main arguments. An analysis of Spain’s policies in these two cases leads me to similar
conclusions to those drawn by several scholars who have studied Spain’s contribution to
saving Jewish life during the Second World War. First, with a firm and decisive policy,
Spain could have done much more than it did to help Sephardic Jews in need; that is, its
potential for saving Jews was not fully realized. This is especially true in the case of
Egypt in the years 1956-1957, and even more so in Libya during the same period. Span-
ish policy experienced frequent changes and lacked coherence and consistency. In the
Francoist leadership, there were constant debates as to the policy that should be adopted.
In fact, the help that was actually extended should be seen, first and foremost, in the con-
text of Spain’s efforts to create a more liberal image for the dictatorship and to strength-
en its ties with Western countries.
Second, throughout its existence, the Francoist dictatorship was determined not to
adopt any measure that might lead to a Jewish resettlement in Spain, even in small num-
bers. During the 1930s and 1940s Spanish nationalists were still glorifying the Catholic
Kings, Isabella and Ferdinand, for their clairvoyance which had made possible “the solu-
tion of the Jewish problem in Spain” in the late fifteenth century.
Third, efforts made to rescue Jews, both during World War II and in Arab countries
in the post-war period, were often the result of initiatives by Spanish diplomats in vari-
ous places and not of a clear policy shaped by the Palace of Santa Cruz, where the For-
eign Ministry was located, nor by the Palace of El Pardo, where Generalísimo Franco
lived. Particularly noteworthy in this respect are the initiatives taken by the Spanish
ambassador in Cairo, Ángel Sagaz.
All these reservations notwithstanding, Spain is still deserving of appreciation for what
it did for Jews, especially for Sephardic Jews in Arab countries during the 1950s and 1960s.
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However little it did, it was often more than what Western democracies did at the time.
Moreover, although the dictatorship’s propaganda greatly exaggerated Spain’s contribution
to the rescue of Jews during the Second World War, it did contribute to the creation of a tra-
dition and a feeling of commitment among Spanish diplomats, who often gave assistance
to persecuted Jews, both in the period discussed in this article as well as in later years.
Extending a Helping Hand During and After the Suez Crisis
During the Suez crisis and the Sinai war, Spain generally showed sympathy towards
Egypt, a position that allowed it to appear as a friend of the Arabs, in contrast to ‘imperi-
alistic’ Britain, France, and Israel.3 On 26 July 1956, the president of Egypt, Gamal
Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal Corporation, which, under British and French
control, administered the canal. In an interview with the newspaper Arriba, Franco
eagerly voiced support for Egypt’s position and criticism of Britain’s policy in the Mid-
dle East (Shneidman 1973: 166). Nasser’s move, however, endangered the Constantino-
ple convention of 1888, which all European maritime nations had signed, and which
declared that the canal must remain ‘open to vessels of all nations’ and ‘free from block-
ade’, a right which was suspended only during the two world wars. 
Nasser nationalized the canal largely in response to the refusal of the US, Britain,
and the World Bank to assist him in building the Aswan Dam – they were concerned
about the economic risk, as well as about growing Soviet influence in Egypt. The Egypt-
ian ruler wanted, among other things, to use the revenue from the canal to finance the
ambitious Aswan project. The international crisis that had just broken out was com-
pounded, of course, by other factors: the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Israeli commando
raids on Egyptian territory; British fear of the threat that Nasser and his aspirations to
leadership of the Arab world posed to Britain’s position in the Middle East; Britain and
France’s concern about their oil supply; and the Paris government’s anger over Nasser’s
support for the rebels in Algeria. Prime Minister Anthony Eden saw Nasser as a ‘megalo-
maniacal dictator,’ and cited the ruinous consequences of the appeasement policy that
Britain had followed during the 1930s as grounds for a firm stand against Egypt.
The major media in Madrid greeted the nationalization of the canal with enthusiasm.
Arriba, Madrid, Pueblo, and Ya all devoted editorials to Nasser’s ‘daring step’ and the
challenge he had set the imperialist powers, using terms that were almost identical to
those employed by the Soviet papers during the period. At the mid-August conference in
London of the principal countries that used the canal, the Spanish delegation, led by for-
eign minister Alberto Martín Artajo, tried to defend Egypt’s interests and to mediate
between Egypt and the Western powers. This diplomatic activity, however, did not satis-
fy Egypt, which expected more vigorous support from Spain given their friendship over
the past decade; and it certainly provoked annoyance in the foreign ministries of Lon-
don, Paris, and Washington.4
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3 On Spain’s relations with Arab countries in those years, see Rein (1999).
4 Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid (hereafter AMAE), Leg. R. 4294/14, R. 4294/15;
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In the meantime, the tension around the Suez Canal was growing. The canal pilots
stopped work, and Egypt tried to recruit others to take their place. Several dozen
Spaniards were hired to help in the operation of the canal. At the beginning of Septem-
ber, some sixty Spaniards announced their willingness to go ‘to defend Egypt from for-
eign aggression,’ and observers in London were already evoking the ‘Blue Division’ that
had been sent by Franco to assist the Wehrmacht in its war against the Soviet Union. Just
before the fighting broke out, General Franco told a reporter from the Associated Press
news agency that the events in Egypt, like those in Algeria and Morocco, reflected
changes in the international sphere and represented a protest against imperialism and
colonial oppression.
Following the coordinated attack on Egypt, “the [Spanish] press and radio were
clearly biased, and even aggressive” towards Israel, France, and Britain, as the president
of the Jewish community in Madrid, Louis Blitz, wrote.5 At the beginning of November,
the Falange organ Arriba claimed that, according to the criteria established at the Nurem-
berg trials, Anthony Eden, Guy Mollet, and David Ben-Gurion could be tried as war
criminals.6 The Falange was very sympathetic to Nasser’s regime; the fall of Argentine
president Juan Perón had dampened the enthusiasm it had shown for Peronism at the end
of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, and the Falange was now ready for another
object of admiration. Now it was enamored of Nasserism, which it saw as the model of a
nationalist regime aspiring to social justice.7
Before long, however, the Spanish media moderated their support for Nasser. The
regime was concerned about its image in the West, and certain circles, particularly in the
military, were worried about the Soviet Union’s growing influence in Egypt and the pos-
sibility that Egypt’s brand of Arab nationalism might encourage calls for the eradication
of the Spanish presence in North Africa, beginning with Río de Oro. The newspaper
ABC published a number of articles which, although expressing disapproval of the man-
ner and timing of the Anglo-French intervention, nevertheless claimed that the operation
would further the interests of the Western bloc, since it had caused the destruction of a
great deal of military equipment that the Soviets had sent to Egypt. Some articles also
maintained that the Russians wanted to take over Egypt and make Nasser their puppet.
Particularly prominent among these articles was one by the retired general Alfredo
Kindelán, one of the founders of the Spanish air force at the time of Alfonso XIII and
commander of Franco’s air force during the Spanish Civil War. The decision in favour of
military intervention was not made by irresponsible fools or bloodthirsty sadists but by
talented politicians, wrote Kindelán, reproaching the Falangist organ Arriba. In mid-
December, Franco met with both the US ambassador in Madrid and the army minister,
Agustín Muñoz Grandes, in quick succession; within two days, the attacks on ‘western
imperialism’ disappeared from the papers.8
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5 Louis Blitz to Ya’acov Tsur, 25 Nov. 1956, Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Israel
State Archive (hereafter ISA), 2520/7.
6 Arriba, 4 Nov. 1956; New York Times, 5 Nov. 1956. Two days later, on 6 Nov., the Egyptian ambassador
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From 1956 onward, the distinction that the Franco regime made between the state of
Israel and Sephardic Jews, particularly those with Spanish citizenship, was clearer than
ever. While rejecting any Israeli initiative to establish diplomatic ties between the two coun-
tries, Franco gradually showed a more tolerant attitude towards the small Jewish communi-
ty in his country and towards Jews, especially Sephardic Jews, in other countries.9 Nasser’s
nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956, triggered a chain of events in Egypt that
worsened the situation of Westerners in Egypt in general, and of the local Jewish communi-
ty in particular. Spain’s ambassador to Cairo, José del Castaño, asked the Madrid foreign
ministry to authorize him, on humanitarian grounds, to provide asylum in the embassy to
anyone in mortal danger who requested it. Martín Artajo, after consulting with Franco, gave
him the requested authorization, on condition that asylum be offered only to those who
were indeed in imminent danger. In this respect it should be mentioned that, in the fall of
1950, King Farouk had paid a private visit to Madrid, and during a talk with the former
Spanish ambassador to Cairo, Carlos Miranda, he said that his government was considering
expelling some twenty thousand Jews from Egypt in retaliation for Israel’s expulsion of
thousands of Arabs from Palestine. As a result of this talk, the Spanish foreign ministry sent
instructions to its representatives in Cairo to protect Jewish subjects of Spain if necessary.
By the end of 1956 some thirty Sephardic families had arrived in Barcelona from Egypt.
Most of them left for other countries after a few months, with the aid of the American Jew-
ish Joint Distribution Committee, and the rest settled in the Catalonian capital.10
Following the joint offensive by Israel, France and Britain, the Jews of Egypt, a com-
munity numbering some fifty thousand whom the nationalist regime identified with
Israel and Zionism, suffered persecution of every kind: mass imprisonment, denial of cit-
izenship, expulsion, property confiscation, loss of employment, and more.11 A decree
published on 22 November amended the 1950 citizenship law to state that Zionists and
those who were not loyal to the state could not receive Egyptian citizenship, and people
in this category who already had citizenship were to be divested of it. The law did not
define who was to be considered a Zionist of course; this was left to the whims of the
authorities. The print media and the radio pursued a campaign of incitement and threats
against Jews, and the latter were exposed to various insults in the street. On this occa-
sion, however, no serious incidents of violence against Jews – of the sort seen in 1948
and 1952 – were recorded. The Alexandria harbor and Cairo airport were full of Jews
seeking to leave the country. Jews who left during those months were forced to leave
their property behind and to give up their Egyptian citizenship. More than one family left
with only the clothes on their backs. All community activity was paralyzed, as were most
of the community’s health, education, and social welfare institutions.12
9 On this topic, see Rein (1997); Lisbona (2002); González García (2001).
10 Nota para Su Excelencia el Generalísimo, 13 Sept. 1950 (AMAE, R.2631/19); Lisbona (1993: 173). 
11 On the Sinai/Suez war, see Louis/Owen (1989); Lucas (1991); Oren (1992). On the situation of the Jews in
Egypt at the time, see Bat-Yeor (1974: 134-136); American Jewish Year Book (hereafter AJYB), Vol. 58
(1957): 398-403; AJYB, Vol. 59 (1958): 395-398; Laskier (1992: 252-264); Schechtman (1961: 196-202).
12 Although the Nasser regime’s policy towards Jews was severe indeed, it is a considerable exaggeration
to liken it to the policy of persecuting Jews in Nazi Germany, as the World Jewish Congress and the
American Jewish Congress have done. See World Jewish Congress (1957); and American Jewish Con-
gress (1957).
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While Nasser declared that the reports of Jews being persecuted in Egypt were base-
less propaganda and that Jews suffered no discrimination whatsoever, the Spanish consul
in Alexandria, Carlos de Urgoiti, spoke of a ‘campaign of terror’ conducted by the police
and military authorities and the national militia of Egypt:
Hebrews [Jews], English, French, and stateless people suffered house searches, confisca-
tion of their property or dismissal from their employment without compensation... Very many
of them were arrested, beaten and mistreated in all kinds of ways which recall the methods of
the Cheka during the era of Red terror in Madrid.13
The ambassador in Cairo also refuted the official press’s declarations concerning the
fraternal relations between Jews and Moslems in Egypt, and the claims of the interior
minister, Zakaria Mohieddine, to the same effect:
These declarations... do not correspond to the reality of what is happening here; there is
no doubt that instructions have been given to force the greatest number of Jews to evacuate
this country, a campaign stimulated by the greedy desire to take over their businesses, compa-
nies, and enterprises and to give their jobs to Moslem Egyptians.14
Among the Jews arrested – whose total number must have exceeded nine hundred –
were four with Spanish citizenship: León J. Israel Modiano, businessman; Jaime Simhon
Bousso, clerk; Ester Yahiel Treves, nurse and director of a Jewish charity association;
and León G. Carasso, commercial agent in Alexandria for a shipping firm, Naviera de
Exportación Agrícola S.A. of Valencia. Among the many hundreds whose property was
impounded (businesses, companies and private houses were seized), another six were
Spanish subjects: Mauricio Benzakein Hakun, Darío Israel Modiano, Bondi M. Saporta,
Saúl Coronel Saragossi, and Máximo and Roberto Braunstein Zaccai. Spanish embassy
officials visited the Jews with Spanish citizenship in prison, about twenty kilometers
away from Cairo, and took care of their needs.15 The Spanish ambassador’s energetic
actions prevented additional arrests of Jews with Spanish citizenship, though many of
them were harassed on various pretexts and were occasionally summoned to the police
station. The ambassador informed the Egyptian authorities of:
the bad impression that the measures taken against the persons and goods of the aforemen-
tioned Spanish subjects had made on the Spanish Government... and that the way they had
been treated [was] contrary to the excellent relations existing between our countries and to
the proofs of friendship recently afforded in relation to the present events.16
Despite Spain’s involvement in international talks to resolve the Suez crisis, and
although it supplied significant quantities of arms to Egypt during the years 1952-1956,
it was not until March 1957, when the authorities began to soften their attitude towards
Jews, that confiscated assets were restored to the Jews mentioned above, with the excep-
26 Raanan Rein
13 Urgoiti to Artajo, 24 Nov. 1956 (AMAE, R.5571/46). 
14 José del Castaño to MAE, 10 Dec. 1956 (AMAE, R.4667/18). 
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tion of those belonging to Bondi Saporta, which were not returned to their lawful owner
until a year later.17
The leaders of the Jewish community in Madrid (Louis A. Blitz, Max Mazín, and
José Benmaman) sent a letter to Franco in December 1956, asking him to intervene on
behalf of their persecuted brothers in Egypt. They requested Spanish aid for all Sephardic
Jews, not just those with Spanish citizenship, and for the rest of the Jews, too, if possible,
as well as asylum in Spain for those Sephardic Jews obliged to leave Egypt.18 Naturally,
the harassment they suffered made many Egyptian Jews opt for emigration, and the
Nasser regime encouraged them to do so. In their letter to the Caudillo, the leaders of the
Madrid community recalled Spain’s efforts to save Jews during World War II. Franco
passed the letter to his minister of foreign affairs, who replied that Spain could not give
Sephardic Jews the same rights as Jews who were Spanish subjects.
Eliahu Eliachar, vice-president of the World Federation of Sephardic Communities,
approached the Spanish consul general in Jerusalem, Mariano Madrazo, and asked if Spain
would agree to serve as a transit station for Sephardic Jews leaving Egypt, who would later
continue on to other destinations. Similar requests to the Spanish government were submit-
ted by the Anglo-Jewish Association through the Spanish ambassador in London, Miguel
Primo de Rivera, and by the World Federation of Sephardic Communities through the Span-
ish ambassador in Washington, José María de Areilza.19 Areilza recommended acceding to
these requests, since “only a few hundred of those having to leave Egypt would go to Spain,”
yet “Spain’s gesture in opening its doors publicly to these former members of our nation
would be highly appreciated, and would have an incalculably favorable impact” on US pub-
lic opinion.20 All along, Spain’s decision-makers tended to overestimate the influence that
Jews had on Western public opinion in general, and on the United States in particular.
At the same time, the foreign ministry in Madrid thought that the arrival in Spain of a
crowd of Jewish refugees might cause a number of political and economic problems; it
was also concerned that some of the refugees might choose to remain in Spain perma-
nently. Foreign ministry officials also pointed out that in December 1924, Spain had
given the Sephardic Jews in Egypt an opportunity to apply for Spanish citizenship, and
many had not bothered to exercise this right. The ministry therefore instructed its repre-
sentatives to make a strict distinction between Jews with Spanish citizenship, who were
to be protected like any Spanish citizen, and other Sephardic Jews, to whom Spain was
willing to provide humanitarian assistance in coordination with the UN and other pow-
ers. In fact, in February 1957, the Spanish government decided that only Spanish citizens
would be eligible for humanitarian assistance.21
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17 See reports from Cairo by José del Castaño (AMAE, R.4491/94, R.4667/18, R.5571/46).
18 Carta de la Comunidad Israelita de Madrid a Franco, 19 Dec. 1956 (AMAE, R.4665/49).
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20 Areilza to Artajo, 30 Jan. 1957 (AMAE, R.4667/18).
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was shared by the Spanish consul general in Jerusalem. See Madrazo to MAE, 8 Dec. 1956 (AMAE,
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Ambassador Castaño’s activity on behalf of Jews with Spanish citizenship was
praiseworthy but to be expected, since these Jews were, after all, citizens of his country.
The importance of this activity should therefore not be exaggerated, as it has been in a
number of recent studies. At any rate, Israel’s ambassador to Paris, Ya’akov Tsur, con-
veyed to his Spanish colleague, José Rojas y Moreno, Israel’s gratitude to the Spanish
embassy in Cairo for their efforts to protect the Jews there – “not only the Sephardic
Jews, but in general all those whose race or nationality made them the object of severe
persecution.” Since Egypt’s lack of diplomatic ties with Britain and France had left no
British or French representatives in Cairo, and the US was afraid to compromise its rela-
tions with the Arabs, the Spanish embassy, according to Tsur, was “the only one that,
with a sense of humanity and great courage, had protected and defended the persecuted
Jews.”22
Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, I have found no evidence that Spain’s efforts
were as widespread as the Israeli ambassador’s words suggest. The Spanish govern-
ment’s less generous side is reflected in a more or less contemporaneous decision con-
cerning Sephardic Jews in Libya made by Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s closest assis-
tant and a blatant anti-Semite. Worried by a series of events that followed Libya’s
declaration of complete independence in 1952, events which included the Israeli-Arab
conflict and the development of relations between Tripoli and the Arab League, the Jews
still in Libya (most of them had emigrated to Israel by the mid-1950s) feared that the
government would not protect them in times of danger, nor renew their passports so that
they could leave the country. Some Libyan-born Sephardic Jews, afraid that the situation
in Libya would worsen, approached the chargé d’affaires in the Spanish embassy in
Tripoli, Ángel Díaz de Tuesta, with a request for Spanish citizenship. This request was
soundly rejected by the foreign ministry upon the instructions of Carrero Blanco.23
Spain’s Help during the Exodus of Egyptian Jewry
In contrast to Spain’s limited efforts on behalf of Jews with Spanish citizenship in
Egypt in 1956 and 1957, in the years that followed the Franco regime made a much more
important contribution to helping Jews in distress in the Arab countries. It assisted the
clandestine mass exodus of Jews from Morocco at the end of the 1950s and, within the
framework of ‘Operation Yakhin’ at the beginning of the 1960s, it allowed the organiza-
tions that were helping these Jews emigrate to Israel to use Spanish territory as a transit
station. The regime also helped Jews to leave Egypt after the Six-Day War.24
A few days after the Six-Day War broke out, the Jewish community in Madrid asked
General Franco to take action to protect Jews in the Arab countries, who were again
being singled out as collaborators and agents in Israel’s service, and were suffering a
22 Rojas y Moreno to Artajo, 8 Jan. 1957 (AMAE, R.4540/19). 
23 Legation in Tripoli to Artajo, 7 Nov. 1956; Carrero to legation in Tripoli, 19 Nov. 1956; and Director
Gral. de Política Exterior to minister in Tripoli, 23 Nov. 1956 (AMAE, R.6170/34). On the situation of
the Jews of Libya in the 1950s and the problem of passports, see Felice (1980: 293-304); Schechtman
(1961: 126-147). 
24 For a recent study of the 1967 War, see Oren (2002).
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27 Cited in Ysart (1973: 154-155). See also Lipschitz (1984: 186-189). On the arrest of Jews immediately
following the outbreak of the Six-Day War, see Bat-Yeor (1974: 138-139); Laskier (1992: 290-294).
new wave of persecution in the name of ‘state security.’ The letter was signed by the
president and vice-president of the Madrid community, Max Mazin and Samuel Toledano
respectively. Similar requests reached the Spanish government from various Jewish
organizations such as the World Jewish Congress, the Sephardic Community of Chicago,
and the American Jewish Committee by way of the ambassador in Washington, Alfonso
Merry del Val, and the Spanish delegation to the UN. At the time the Spanish govern-
ment was publishing declarations of support for the Arab position, while its spokesmen
called for the return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes and the establishment of
peace in the Middle East on the basis of the 1947 UN partition resolution. 
Following a cabinet meeting headed by General Franco, the Spanish government
decided to accede to the Jewish petitions.25 Some two weeks after the fighting began,
instructions were sent to Spain’s legations in Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, and
Morocco stipulating that when Jews, “whether Sephardic or not,” applied to them for
assistance, “the possibility of exercising the available means of protection should be
considered, always with the agreement of the local authorities.” Spanish diplomats were
told that should the Egyptian government be prepared to allow Jews to depart, they were
to provide those Jews with whatever documents and help they needed to leave the coun-
try. These instructions stressed that Spain’s motives were purely humanitarian, and that
such actions were in no way at variance with Spain’s support for the Arab cause.26
The remnants of the once thriving Jewish community in Egypt, which had dwindled
from ninety thousand people on the eve of World War II to no more than a few thousand,
were treated with rough cruelty. Not long after the war began, a few hundred Jews were
arrested, including most of the men of the community. After two or three days they were
transferred to the Abu-Zaabal prison near the capital. A hysterical, vengeful mob tried to
attack them on their way there. In prison, the Jews were brutally mistreated by their
guards. The Spanish ambassador in Cairo, Ángel Sagaz, petitioned the police, the interi-
or ministry and President Nasser himself to obtain the release of Jews being held in
severe conditions, and to obtain permission to leave the country for those Jews who
desired it. Sagaz argued that there was no reason to doubt Spanish friendship for the
Arab countries, the proof being that Spain had never recognized Israel. He emphasized
that for many years Spain had been trying to protect the descendants of the Jews expelled
from Spain. Spain understood that the Egyptian authorities had to take measures against
certain people during wartime for reasons of security, but it knew – the Spanish diplomat
added – that the Egyptian authorities had never discriminated against anyone ‘for rea-
sons of race or religion.’
Accordingly, Spain was willing to offer documents and travel tickets to Jews wishing
to leave the country, if the police had no objection to their departure.27 The ambassador
promised that those Jews who left the country would not become propaganda tools
against the Nasser regime, and would not emigrate to Israel, but to countries in Europe
and to America. Indeed, every Jew who received a Spanish passport was asked not to
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publicize the situation of the Jews in Egypt and not to emigrate to Israel immediately, in
order not to endanger those of their brothers who remained behind. The Spanish pass-
ports issued to Jews were good for only two years, and could not be renewed.
In late August 1967, the president of Cairo’s Jewish community, Meir Asher, came to
the Spanish embassy to express the community’s gratitude for Spain’s humanitarian
efforts on behalf of the local Jewry. Asher also suggested depositing a series of valuable
medieval manuscripts and objects in the embassy, or even moving them to Spain, for fear
they might be damaged in the old synagogues that had been closed down. Ambassador
Ángel Sagaz said that valuable historical pieces that had been catalogued by the Egypt-
ian authorities could not be brought to the embassy, as Spain did not want to enter into
conflict with regard to objects that were considered Egyptian artistic patrimony. Still,
several valuable objects from the local synagogues were sent to the Madrid Jewish com-
munity with the help of the Spanish embassy (González García 2001: 249-250).
During the years 1967-1969, a total of more than six hundred and fifteen families –
more than one thousand five hundred Jews – left Egypt with the help of the Spanish gov-
ernment and the energetic efforts of the Spanish ambassador in Cairo, Ángel Sagaz. Sev-
eral hundred of them were liberated from prisons and detention camps. Lists of all
detained Jews were supplied by representatives of the American Jewish Committee in
Washington to the leaders of the Madrid community, Mazin and Toledano, who passed
them, in turn, to the Foreign Office, located in the Santa Cruz Palace. This assistance
was given behind a veil of secrecy in order not to endanger its success and due to the
close relations between Spain and the Arab countries. However, curiously enough,
although they were revealed by the US press as early as 1968,28 Spain’s efforts are not
mentioned at all in histories of the Jews of Egypt in the twentieth century. 
In the initial stages, Spain paid all the expenses involved in issuing documents, trans-
ferring Jews from prison or from their homes to airports or seaports, and transporting
them abroad. At this point, most of them left by ship to various Mediterranean destina-
tions; only the old, the sick and the blind were evacuated on airplanes. At later stages,
HIAS, an aid organization for Jewish emigrants and refugees, arranged for their evacua-
tion and paid their airfare, on Air France planes, to Paris.29 The Jews who left Egypt
were allowed to take only a few possessions with them; they were forced to leave valu-
able items such as wedding rings, bracelets and watches behind. At Sagaz’s suggestion,
they were able to deposit such valuables at the Spanish embassy in Cairo for transport
out of the country in the Spanish diplomatic bag, after which they could reclaim them
abroad (Lipschitz 1984: 189).30
Spain’s action earned it the gratitude of Jewish organizations all over the world, as
well as that of the Johnson administration. The Madrid government’s anger was there-
fore all the greater when, in mid-December 1967, during a debate in one of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly committees on the decolonialization of Gibraltar, the Israeli delegate,
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Arye Ilan, made a speech against Spain, in an attempt to explain why Israel was abstain-
ing from the vote of censure against British occupation of the disputed Rock. In his
speech – delivered in the midst of the evacuation operation of Egyptian Jewry sponsored
by Spain – Ilan mentioned the ‘Blue Division’ which Spain had sent to fight alongside
the armies of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front during World War II, and ridiculed the
notion that a representative of dictatorial Spain should pretend to teach the committee
members the laws of freedom, democracy, and social justice. The Spanish delegate,
Jaime de Piniés, responded harshly. He accused Israel of ‘Nazi behavior’ and ‘aggressive
activity’ towards its Arab neighbors, and advised it to remember the help Spain had
given the Jews during World War II. 
Protest and criticism were not restricted to the pages of the Spanish press. Max
Mazín, president of the Madrid Jewish community, sent a telegram of complaint to the
Israeli foreign minister, Abba Eban, in which he denounced the ‘wounding references’ to
Spain in the Israeli delegate’s speech. Eliahu Eliachar, one of the leaders of the Sephardic
community in Jerusalem, asked Abba Eban: “How did it happen, who needed this, who
gave the instructions for an Israeli representative to come out with a sharp anti-Spanish
speech?”31
During the same period, similar efforts on behalf of Jews in distress were made by
Spain’s ambassadors in Baghdad and Tripoli, but were unsuccessful owing to the opposi-
tion of the Iraqi and Libyan authorities. The government of Syria, too, took a stern line
with what it saw as interference in its internal affairs. In 1972, however, following a
request by the head of the Mossad, Tzvi Zamir, to his Spanish counterpart, a few dozen
Syrian Jews left Syria through Lebanon with the aid of Spanish documents (Lisbona
1993: 206-210).
As we have seen, the Francoist regime’s propaganda about the help given to Jews
during the Second World War created a certain commitment among decision-makers in
Madrid, as well as Spanish diplomats in various countries, to assist persecuted Jews.
Jewish organizations around the world could approach the Spanish government and its
representatives and ask for their help, basing their requests on the precedent of World
War II. Spanish diplomacy was pushed into actions that supposedly projected backwards
to the 1940s and served as additional proof of Spain’s contribution to the salvation of
Jews during the Holocaust.
Spain had no clear and coherent policy on this issue, both during the war years and in
the 1950s and 1960s. The shaping of such a policy was not an easy task, due to internal
debates in the Francoist leadership as to the measures to be adopted. Among the consid-
erations discussed, the first and foremost was related to efforts to strengthen relations
with the United States and improve the dictatorship’s image in Western public opinion,
which in the Francoist world view was greatly influenced by Jewish interests. As a
nationalist dictatorship with a monolithic concept of Spanish identity, it was hard for the
Francoist regime to extend generous support to Jews in distress in the Arab countries,
especially if such support might entail the resettlement of even small groups of Jews in
Spain itself. Nevertheless, in view of the lack of action on the part of other countries, and
even if Spain’s considerations were indeed motivated largely by the desire to project a
Francoist Spain and Egyptian Jews, 1956-1968 31
31 Jewish Chronicle, 27 Dec. 1967; Eliachar (1980: 335); Lisbona (1993: 202).
Rev23-01  30/8/06  23:25  Página 31
positive image of itself to the West, Francoist Spain’s policy towards the plight of Jews
in Arab countries is worthy of recognition.
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